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Abstract in English 
This paper contributes to the broad literature on public services contracting in two ways. First, 
we provide an empirical analysis of contracting decisions in the provision of welfare-to-work 
(WTW) services. We estimate both the WTW-contracting decisions of Dutch municipalities and 
their impact on the performance, measured as the fraction of Social Assistance recipients. 
Second, we explicitly model two forms of external provision of WTW services by 
municipalities: contracting with other municipalities and/or contracting out services to private 
providers. Our findings suggest that contracting decisions are predominantly driven by cost 
considerations, both for the decision to contract with other municipalities and the share of 
contracting out to private providers. Municipalities with low WTW budgets or facing budget 
constraints are more likely to contract with external parties – presumably this reduces their costs 
and as well as the risk of future cost deficits. We do not find contracting decisions to affect the 
performance of municipalities, measured as the use, inflow or outflow out of the SA scheme. 
From this alone, however, we cannot conclude that both the three provision modes are equally 
cost-effective too, as external provision may be less costly. 
 
Key words: welfare-to-work, public versus private provision, contracting, effectiveness. 
JEL codes: D02, D73, H11, H44, H53, H75, I38, L24 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Sociale diensten in Nederland besteden een aanzienlijk deel van hun re-integratiegelden uit aan 
private re-integratiebedrijven, WSW-organisaties en (andere) hulpverlenende instanties. 
Tegelijkertijd is een trend waarneembaar naar samenvoeging van re-integratieactiviteiten met 
nabij gelegen sociale diensten. Dit onderzoek tracht te achterhalen wat de beweegredenen van 
gemeenten zijn bij het uitbesteden en samenwerken, alsmede de gevolgen van deze keuzes voor 
de effectiviteit van re-integratie. Een belangrijke bevinding is dat de keuze van gemeenten tot 
contracteren – zowel met private re-integratiebedrijven als met omringende gemeenten – 
afhangt van de financiële ruimte waarover zij beschikken: hoe krapper het re-integratiebudget, 
hoe minder re-integratie zij binnenshuis zullen aanbieden. Verder zijn er geen sterke 
aanwijzingen dat contracteren leidt tot meer of minder cliënten in de bijstand. Hieruit kunnen 
we echter niet concluderen dat beide vormen van re-integratie om het even zijn – privaat 
aanbesteden zou namelijk gepaard kunnen gaan met lagere uitvoeringskosten. 
 
Steekwoorden: re-integratie, bijstand, aanbesteden, effectiviteit. 
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Summary 
Over the years, the number of evaluation studies of welfare-to-work (WTW) policies has 
increased substantially. Typically, in these studies effectiveness is considered as dependent on 
instrument types and worker characteristics. Evidence on the organization of programs is 
however scarce – that is, little is known on the role of caseworkers and private WTW providers.  
Various countries, like the US, UK, Australia and the Netherlands, have switched to systems 
where a substantial part of public programs have been contracted out to external job training 
providers, ranging from other governments to private firms. These changes have raised 
questions on the optimal allocation of WTW-programs to public and private providers. So far, 
however the perspective of studies on WTW contracting is on the effectiveness of contracted 
programs itself, not as compared to in-house provision. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on public services contracting in two ways. First, to our 
knowledge we provide the first empirical analysis of contracting decisions in the provision of 
WTW services. Heretofore we use data both administrative and survey data of Dutch 
municipalities for 2007 and 2008. We estimate both the contracting decisions of the WTW 
services of municipalities, as well as their impact on their fractions of Social Assistance (SA) 
recipients – the underlying idea being that more effective policies would lead to higher outflow 
rates out of SA and lower stock levels of SA recipients. As to the contracting model, we use a 
number of variables that are associated with the contractibility of the SA recipients (i.e. distance 
to the labour market); the patronage hypothesis (i.e. budget space and budget exhaustion 
measures); and political preferences (i.e. the fraction of votes on left wing parties in a 
municipality). Some of these variables can be used as exclusion restrictions in the second stage 
of our model, when explaining the relative impact of in-house provision vis-à-vis contracting on 
the performance of municipalities.  
 
The second innovative feature of this paper relates to the forms the external provision of WTW 
services by municipalities may have. First, municipalities may decide to contract with other 
(adjacent) municipalities, thus attaining scale advantages and the opportunity to provide more 
specialized services. Second, both municipalities and municipality cooperatives may decide to 
contract out WTW services to private providers. Thus, the contracting decision a municipality is 
faced with cannot be characterized as a make or buy decision only. Instead, contracting with 
adjacent municipalities can be considered as an option that is in between in-house provision by 
oneself and contracting out – assuming that municipalities joining their efforts have stronger 
preference for quality than private providers, while providing scale advantages compared to 
internal provision at the same time. As opposed to that, the joint provision of WTW services 
may result in a decrease in residual controls for municipalities in WTW policies, as well as 
coordination and free rider problems between municipalities joining in.   8 
In short, our findings suggest that contracting decisions are predominantly driven by cost 
considerations, both for the decision to contract with other municipalities and that of contracting 
out to private providers. Municipalities with low WTW budgets or facing budget constraints are 
more likely to contract with external parties – this reduces costs and as well as the risk of cost 
deficits. There is only weak evidence that municipalities increase the share of contracting to 
private providers if the contractibility of their SA recipients is higher – that is, when clients are 
easier to place into jobs. Further, municipalities with a high share of votes for left wing parties 
are more likely to contract with other municipalities. Finally, we do not find evidence for 
contracting decisions to affect the performance of municipalities, measured as the use, inflow or 
outflow out of the SA scheme. This holds both for contracting with other municipalities and 
contracting out to private providers. 
 
Our results lend credence to the public patronage hypothesis – that is, municipalities seem to 
respond to budget constraints. As most municipalities experienced budget surpluses in the time 
period under investigation, one may suspect that municipalities tended to spend too much of 
their budgets on in-house provision. We do however not find any evidence for private provision 
to be more effective. Essentially, this result can be explained in three ways. First, our contract 
measures may simply be too global and data size to small to obtain significant estimates. IN 
particular, the impact of WTW-spending is only small. So when supposing that changing 
provision modes can only change the overall effectiveness of WTW spending to some extent, 
the coefficient estimates will be even smaller. Second, one should take in mind that 
municipalities were committed to private provision of their services only until 2006. After that, 
the share of in-house provision has increased gradually but still is at a relatively low level. 
Finally, within the context of the Dutch system, public and private WTW providers are perhaps 
not that different after all. The majority of private providers in the WTW sector – at least those 
contracted by municipalities – consist of non-profit organizations with strong ties to the social 
assistance desks. These organizations mostly have long term contracts and were often part of 
the municipality services in the past.    
 
All in all, our results may suggest that differences in WTW provision modes are not very 
important – at least when measured in effectiveness. This conclusion would however ignore 
program costs. If the public patronage is important, costs per client are likely to be 
unnecessarily high. Evidence from the Australian Job Network shows that privatization has led 
to substantial cost reductions, while maintaining the same level of effectiveness. This calls for 
further research on the costs attached to the provision of WTW programs.   9 
1  Introduction
1 
Over the years, the number of evaluation studies of welfare-to-work (WTW) policies has 
increased substantially. Typically, in these studies effectiveness is considered as dependent on 
instrument types and worker characteristics (Card et al. 2009). Evidence on the organization of 
programs is however scarce – that is, little is known on the added value of caseworkers and 
private WTW providers. In particular, one of the key questions policymakers are currently 
faced with is whether they should opt for in-house provision or contracted programs. Various 
countries have switched to systems where a substantial part of public programs have been 
contracted out to external job training providers, ranging from other governments to private 
firms. Examples include Struyven and Steurs (2005), who discuss the privatization of WTW-
services in Australia and the Netherlands, and Heinrich and Choi (2007), who analyze changes 
in the contracting process of the Wisconsin Works program. These changes have raised 
questions on the optimal allocation of trajectories to public and private providers. Some 
countries or states have even witnessed a ‘contracting back-in’, as market solutions would not 
take proper account of the complexity of public services (Hefetz and Warner 2004). Empirical 
research is lacking on the determinants of provision modes of WTW services, as well as their 
impact on performance measures. 
 
When taking a broad perspective on the literature on contracting of public services, essentially 
two strands can be distinguished: analyses of the contracting decision itself and those 
addressing the relative performance in case of in-house vis-à-vis procured services. As to the 
first, seminal contributions have been made by Hart et al. (1997) and Blank (2000). Hart et al. 
(1997) model the degree of contractibility to explain the contracting decision in general, 
whereas Blank (2000) places a special interest in social services of the public sector. Lopez et 
al. (1997) distinguish three mechanisms driving the contracting decision: efficiency and 
contractibility arguments, political patronage and budget constraints and ideological motives. 
Empirical applications on the contracting decision typically include service sectors in which 
quality can be relatively well observed, such as prisons (Hart et al. 1997), refuse collection 
(Dijkgraaf et al. 2003) or school cleaning (Christofferson et al. 2007). Also some studies have 
been conducted on samples of public services of US municipalities or counties (Lopez et al. 
1997; Brown and Potoski 2003a, b; Levin and Tadelis 2007). Most studies confirm the political 
patronage hypothesis, with more recent ones also finding evidence for the importance of 
contractibility arguments. 
 
1 The Dutch Council for Work and Income (RWI) is acknowledged for kindly giving access to the Omnibus survey. In 
particular, Sjaak Koehler from RWI and Riemer Kemper in particular are thanked for helping us to get acquainted with the 
Omnibus data. Further, we would like to thank Wouter Roorda and Nine de Graaf for providing us with the financial 
information of municipalities, and Peter Dekker and Annemiek van Vuren for the information of municipality characteristics. 
Ali Aouragh is thanked for his excellent research assistance, particularly in merging our data sources. Finally, Carolyn 
Heinrich and Daniel van Vuuren are gratefully acknowledged for useful comments on earlier versions of the paper.    10 
Various papers also address the actual effects of contracting on quality and costs. Domberger et 
al. (1997) present a meta-analysis in which they argue that contracting leads to costs savings of 
about 20% at constant quality levels. Jensen et al. (2004) also find costs savings, but argue that 
these may be transitory. For the social services sector, again the evidence is scarce. Although 
currently there are strong debates on the relative efficiency and quality of public and private 
hospitals or schools, choices are typically made here by individual clients, rather than 
governments by contracting. As to the provision of WTW services in particular, the perspective 
of some recent studies is mostly on the effectiveness of contracted programs itself, and not as 
compared to in-house provision (Bernard and Wolf 2008; Winterhager et al. 2006). In addition, 
some studies report improvements in placement rates in case of privatized provision, where 
payment schemes are related to the performance of providers (Finn 2008). These studies 
however seem to point at the effectiveness of performance based systems – regardless whether 
these apply to private or public providers (see. e.g. Burgess et al. 2004). 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on public services contracting in two ways. First, to our 
knowledge we provide the first empirical analysis of the use and usefulness of contracting in the 
provision of WTW services. For this purpose, we merge administrative and survey data of 
Dutch municipalities for 2007 and 2008. We estimate both the contracting decisions of 
municipalities, as well as the impact of these decisions on the performance of municipalities, 
measured as the fraction of their Social Assistance (SA) recipients. As to the contracting model, 
we use a number of variables that are associated with the contractibility of the social assistance 
recipients (i.e. distance to the labour market); the patronage hypothesis (i.e. budget space and 
budget exhaustion measures); and political preferences (i.e. the fraction of votes on left wing 
parties in a municipality). Some of these variables can be used as exclusion restrictions in the 
second stage of our model, when explaining the relative impact of in-house provision vis-à-vis 
contracting on the performance of municipalities.  
 
The second innovative feature of this paper is related to the forms that the external provision of 
WTW services by municipalities may have. Essentially, this involves two decisions that both 
are modelled separately and are not mutually exclusive. First, municipalities may decide to 
contract with other (adjacent) municipalities, thus attaining scale advantages and the 
opportunity to provide more specialized services. Second, both municipalities and municipality 
cooperatives may decide to contract out services to private providers. Thus the contracting 
decision a municipality is faced with cannot be characterized as a make or buy decision only 
(Brown and Potoski 2003b). Instead, contracting with adjacent municipalities can be considered 
as an option that is in between in-house provision by oneself and contracting out – assuming 
that cooperating municipalities are more likely to have strong preferences for quality than 
private providers, while providing scale advantages compared to internal provision at the same 
time. Such scale advantages are not only confined to (lower) production costs, but also in the   11 
process of joint contracting to private providers (Brown and Potoski 2003b). As opposed to that, 
joint provision of WTW services may result in a decrease in residual controls for municipalities 
in WTW policies, as well as coordination and free rider problems between municipalities 
joining in. 
 
In short, our findings suggest that contracting decisions are predominantly driven by cost 
considerations, both for the decision to contract with other municipalities and that of contracting 
out to private providers. Municipalities with low WTW budgets or facing budget constraints are 
more likely to contract with external parties – this probably reduces their costs and as well as 
the risk of cost deficits. There is only weak evidence that municipalities increase the share of 
contracting to private providers if the contractibility of their SA recipients is higher – that is, 
when clients are easier to place into jobs. Further, municipalities with a high share of votes for 
left wing parties are more likely to contract with other municipalities. Finally, we do not find 
evidence for contracting decisions to affect the performance of municipalities, measured as the 
use, inflow or outflow out of the SA scheme. From this alone, however, we cannot conclude 
that both the three provision modes are equally efficient as well, as the contract model outcomes 
suggest that external provision is less costly. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional settings of the Dutch SA 
scheme, the provision of WTW services and the data sources that are used for our analysis. In 
section 3 we present our empirical findings. Section 4 ends with discussion on our results.   12   13 
2  Institutions and data  
2.1  Institutional context 
In the Netherlands, unemployed workers may be entitled to benefits either by the 
unemployment insurance (UI) scheme or by the social assistance (SA) scheme. Statutory UI 
benefits cover 70% of the last earned wage, with entitlement periods that are related to 
individual working experience.
2 The UI scheme is carried out by the (public) social benefit 
administration. If workers are not or no longer entitled to UI benefits and do not have any 
partner income or (substantial) private wealth, they are entitled to SA benefits. The level of SA 
benefits is equal to the social minimum, which is 70% of the statutory Minimum Wage for 
single person households. The administration of SA benefits is carried out by local 
municipalities.  
 
As of 2004, municipalities receive lump sum payments for the number of SA recipients that is 
determined by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Unemployment. As a result, there are strong 
incentives for municipalities to lower their number of SA recipients. The lump sum payments 
are determined by a number of variables that are considered to be exogenous to the municipally 
policies, such as the population fraction of low incomes, lone parent households, one person 
households, immigrants and the degree of urbanisation.
3 In addition, municipalities receive 
earmarked budgets for the provision of their WTW-services. In contrast to the lump sum 
financing for SA benefits, these budgets have remained more or less constant for a longer 
period of time, thus lacking a strong connection to the actual number of SA benefit recipients or 
exogenous variables driving the SA population size – we discuss this issue in more detail when 
addressing the data. Since 2006, municipalities can freely decide on the extent to which they 
spend their WTW budgets on in-house and private provision – as long as they give account to 
the Ministry that the amounts have actually been spent on WTW services. 
 
2.2  Administrative and survey data 
Our analysis uses data from three sources. First, administrative data for 2007 and 2008 on the 
stocks and flows of SA, as well as on the SA benefit and WTW budgets are derived from 
records of the Ministry of Social Affairs. These data have been merged to information on 
municipality characteristics from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and survey data on 
 
2 During the period of investigation the UI benefit period could vary between six months to five years. In order to be eligible 
for UI, workers should have paid UI premiums for 48 months in the previous 60 months. Until 2007, for workers of 57,5 
years and older, the entitlement period in principle was 5 years. 
3 The complete list of variables in the budgeting formula included: low income households, lone parents households, 
disabled workers, immigrants, low educated, rental houses, number of inhabitants, labour supply, number of jobs in retail 
and hotel and catering industry, regional job growth, the number of jobs per inhabitant and the labour participation rate of 
women (Vemer et al. 2007).     14 
WTW policies – our second and third sources of information, respectively. Data from CBS 
include variables determining the lump sum payments to municipalities, as well as some 
additional characteristics, e.g. on political preferences. Survey data are derived from a recent 
survey among policy officials at municipalities, set up by the Council for Work and Income: the 
Omnibus Survey.
4 This survey comprises two waves (2007 and 2008) with samples of 
municipalities, aiming to give insight into the way municipalities organize their WTW-policies. 
From the Omnibus Survey, we extract the shares of in-house and contracted WTW-services, as 
well as dummy indicators showing whether groups of municipalities have joined their WTW-
policies. Survey questions for these groups of municipalities were filled in by officials of one 
participating municipality only. Thus, in order to match up with the Omnibus data, the 
administrative data from the Ministry and CBS had to be aggregated to level of municipalities 
joining their WTW-policies. 
 
Table 2.1 presents the sample averages and standard deviations of the merged sample, both for 
the full sample of municipalities and for the sample that participated in the Omnibus Survey. It 
should be stressed at this point that data of municipalities contracting within each other are 
aggregated to the level of groups, causing the number of observations of the full sample to be 
lower than the actual number of municipalities in 2007 and 2008. In particular, in the full 
sample we have 395 observations in 2007 and 379 observations in 2008, whereas the actual 
number was 443 in both years. As the number of (observed) municipality with joined contracts 
was fairly constant, this means that the average number of municipalities per municipality 
group has increased in 2008. 
 
When considering the budgeting of municipalities, we see that the average WTW budget per 
SA client was about 4,000 euros per year. The standard variation in the budgets per client was 
substantial, amounting to about 2,300 euro.
5 The maximum budgets that could be spent on 
WTW services by municipalities were substantially higher than the actual spending. Only about 
60% of the budget was used, with surpluses for a major part being transferred to the next year. 
This explains why budgets were usually not exhausted, only 5% of the municipalities used more 
than their budget. In both years most of the WTW budgets was spent on contracting to private 
organizations (74% on average). Figure 2.1 shows that the distribution of the fractions is 
skewed to the left, with more than half of the observations being 80% or higher. The figure also 
makes apparent that policy officials that were interviewed mostly reported rounded figures. In 
our analysis we therefore have to take account of measurement errors in observed WTW 
 
4 In Dutch: “RWI Omnibus enquête”. RWI has provided a web-application to extract statistics from the Omnibus Survey at 
http://rwi.stratusbv.nl/# . 
5 The exact standard deviation of WTW budget per client amounted to 57.7% compared to the average budget. This 
variation is predominantly due to ex ante differences between budgets per client, rather than ex post differences between 
the actual and budgeted number of SA clients. By contrast, the variation in the average SA benefit budget per client stems 
only from differences between budgeted and actual SA clients –- yielding a standard deviation of 10.8%.      15 
fractions – we return to this issue later when discussing the specification of our model. For 2008 
only, spending on private contracts can be subdivided in those with private for-profit providers 
(22%) and private non-profit providers (50%). Contracts with private non-profit providers were 
usually lengthier than those with those with for-profits. Finally, it should be noted that the 
sample averages of the lump sum and actual SA benefit spending are substantially higher in the 
selected sample than in the full sample. This stems from the fact that larger municipalities were 
more likely to engage in Omnibus Survey. 
 























When comparing the columns of Table 2.1, it becomes apparent that the characteristics of 
municipalities are very similar in the full and selected sample. Almost all differentials – if any – 
seem attributable to the larger population size in the selected (survey) sample. Moreover, note 
that the incidence of SA is higher in the selected sample, with a lower outflow rate out of the 
scheme. Apparently this reflects the fact that highly urbanised municipalities have higher 
unemployment rates. Finally, we have included the fraction of municipality votes for left wing 
parties (i.e. socialists, social-democrats and green parties).
6  As we will argue later on, this 
variable will be used as an exclusion restriction variable that possibly explains contracting 
decisions, rather than directly affecting the performance of municipalities. 
 
 
6 More specifically, according to our definition left wing parties include the socialists (SP), social-democrats (PvdA), greens 
(Groen Links), and social-liberals (D66). Religious parties (CDA, CU and SGP), conservative liberals (VVD) are defined as 
right-wings parties, whereas votes to smaller local parties are left out.    16 
Table 2.1  Sample statistics of gross and selected sample of municipalities (2007-2008): averages and 
standard deviations (* and * indicate differences between the sample averages with 10% or 1% 
significance, respectively). 
  Gross  Selected 
     
(Aggregate) Municipality observations in sample  774  357 
- 2007  395  162 
- 2008  379  195 
     
Municipality cooperatives: observations
 a  ─  45 (143) 
- 2007   ─  23   (63) 
- 2008   ─  22   (80) 
     
Welfare-to-work (WTW) and other expenditures     
WTW expenditures per client (euros)  4,042   (104.0)  3,973   (121.7) 
WTW expenditures as fraction of (yearly) WTW budget  0.591  (0.010)  0.610   (0.018) 
Fraction in-house provision  ─  0.262   (0.014) 
Fraction private non-profit providers (in 2008)  ─  0.503   (0.020) 
Fraction private for-profit providers (in 2008)  ─  0.220   (0.015) 
     
Lump sum budget for SA (x 1,000,000 euros)  9.952   (1.273)  12.887*  (2.374) 
Expenditures for SA (x 1,000,000 euros)  10.311  (1.338)  13.432* (2.553) 
SA Expenditures / lump sum budget  1.024  (0.004)  1.029   (0.006) 
     
Characteristics of labour supply (fractions)     
Male  0.571   (0.001)  0.572   (0.001) 
Disabled  0.048   (0.000)  0.048   (0.001) 
Non-native  0.162   (0.002)  0.165   (0.003) 
Medium education level  0.451   (0.002)  0.452   (0.002) 
High education level  0.297   (0.002)  0.297   (0.003) 
15-24 years of age  0.114   (0.000)  0.115*  (0.001) 
25-34 years of age  0.230   (0.001)  0.229   (0.001) 
35-44 years of age  0.286   (0.000)  0.285   (0.001) 
45-54 years of age  0.251   (0.001)  0.250   (0.001) 
55-65 years of age  0.120   (0.001)  0.120   (0.001) 
     
Size and characteristics municipality population     
Population size   41,487   (2,232)  51,052** (3,864) 
Population size, corrected for collaborating municipalities  39,030   (2,191)  45,598** (3,783) 
Number of households  18,194   (1,146)  22,493** (1,979) 
     
Fraction one person households  0.283   (0.002)  0.288   (0.004) 
Fraction lone parent families  0.054   (0.000)  0.055   (0.001) 
Fraction rental houses  0.339   (0.003)  0.347*  (0.005) 
Fraction subsidized rental houses  0.263   (0.003)  0.270*  (0.004) 
Fraction of inhabitants in urban environment  0.367   (0.012)  0.408** (0.019) 
Fraction votes for left wing parties  0.367   (0.008)  0.364   (0.012) 
     
Social assistance (SA)      
Fraction SA recipients of population  0.011   (0.000)  0.011*  (0.000) 
Fraction of yearly outflow out of SA  0.435   (0.005)  0.427*  (0.006) 
Fraction SA inflow of population  0.003   (0.000)  0.004   (0.000) 
     
a The numbers between brackets here indicate the total number of municipalities that have joined there WTW efforts (not the number of 
municipality groups).   17 
Table 2.2  Transition matrix of municipalities: in and out of the sample, and contracting with other 
municipalities or not. 
2008  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
2007 ↓ 




Not in sample  Total 
         
In sample, no contracting  80  5  52  137 
In sample, contracting  6  28  29  63 
Not in sample  87  47  109  243 
         
Total  173  80  190  443 
 
Table 2.2 presents a transition matrix describing the dynamics of municipalities in the full and 
selected sample. Note that in this table we use individual municipalities as the unit of analysis 
(443 in total) – not municipality cooperatives as aggregated observations. In 2007, in the 
selected sample we have 137 (69%) municipalities that organize their WTW-service on their 
own and 63 (31%) municipalities that contract with other municipalities. Thus, the response rate 
is 45%. In 2008 the response rate has increased to 57% (i.e. 253 municipality observations). 
Still, in the selected sample only 108 municipalities are observed twice – with both the 
refreshment sample and attrition in 2008 being substantial (134 and 81 observations, 
respectively). Apparently survey administrators put more priority to drawing new municipalities 
in the sample than keeping in the participating ones.   18   19 
3  Empirical analysis 
3.1  Theoretical considerations 
As argued earlier, the literature distinguishes three leading theories of contracting decisions of 
public services: efficiency arguments, political patronage and ideology (Lopez et al. 1998). 
Efficiency arguments are associated with the incomplete contracts and asset specificity of 
services. Within the context of WTW services, the incompleteness of contracts is particularly 
relevant for hard-to-place SA clients. WTW programs for this group will take a long period and 
monitoring the effects even longer – if they can be measured at all. In these cases contracting 
out to external providers may therefore be inefficient. As opposed to that, long term 
unemployed clients may need services that are specialized, involving the help of various 
specialists, like teachers, doctors and coaches. Contracting with other municipalities may 
therefore be a way to offer economies of scope, while having less contractibility problems than 
with private providers.  
 
In our data there are various municipality variables characterizing the composition and therefore 
also the contractibility and asset specificity of WTW services for SA recipients. For instance, 
the reintegration of lone parents may require expensive, specialized services. As to the complete 
set of explanatory variables in our data, however, it is impossible to conduct an overall test on 
the (net) importance of contractibility and asset specificity aspects. We therefore propose the 
expected share of SA recipients of the total municipality population – as used in the lump sum 
budgeting formula – as an overall proxy for the contractibility of SA recipients. This seems a 
fair assumption to make, as municipalities with a higher faction of SA recipients usually are 
associated with a high share of long term benefit recipients as well. 
As a second explanation for public contracting decisions, political patronage arguments may 
well be relevant for WTW provision too. Municipality workers may favour in-house provision 
to protect jobs. Local politicians mostly want to avoid the opposition of their civil servants and 
may use in-house provision as a way to achieve their own interests. Lopez et al. (1998) even 
state that budget constraints for politicians are necessary to prevent the provision of services to 
become fully public. Budget constraints may therefore play an important role in curbing in-
house provision. Moreover, if municipalities’ in-house provision tends to be too extensive, we 
may expect the effectiveness of WTW services to be lower too. As to the financial and 
budgeting information on municipalities, two variables may be of particular interest here. If 
public patronage is important, the budget per client is likely to restrain in-house provision. 
Similarly, if budgets are exhausted we may expect municipalities being more likely to switch to 
contracting with neighbouring municipalities or contracting out to private providers. 
   20 
Finally, ideological arguments stress voter preferences on the provision of services. Typically, 
left wing parties favour the in-house provision of services, and the so called “publicness” of 
WTW services seems no exception to this. Therefore, as a proxy for this we use the share of left 
wing votes in the municipality.  
 
3.2  Empirical implementation 
The contracting decisions 
Our empirical analysis on the use and usefulness of contracting modes can be characterized as a 
two stage model. In the first stage, we specify the two contracting options that require a 
different way of modelling. In particular, the decision to contract with other municipalities is a 
discrete choice. Instead the share of WTW-budgets that is contracted out to private providers is 
a continuous variable. For the first decision, indicated by the dummy value Cjoin , we thus adopt 
a (nonlinear) Probit specification, whereas the contracting out share, Cout, is specified in a linear 
model – see equations (1) and (2): 
 
(1)    Pr (  Cjoin ,it  =  1 )   =  Φ  ( Xit ajoin ) 
 
(2)   Cout, it      =  Xit aout  +  εit  , 
 
with municipality index i (i = 1,..I ) and year t (t = 2007,2008). Φ represents the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function, X is a matrix representing the municipality 
characteristics, ajoin and aout describe the effects of X on the respective decision processes and ε 
is an error term that is identically and independently distributed with variance σε
2.  We initially 
assume that the (unobserved) residual term in equation (1) and ε are uncorrelated. Under this 
assumption both equations can be estimated separately. As argued in the previous subsection, X 
includes proxies for the contractibility of SA clients, the budgeting process and political 
preferences of the municipalities. Equation (1) can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood, 
allowing for clustering effects at the level of municipalities. Likewise, as such effects may also 
apply to the contracting out decision, clustering for municipalities is needed when estimating 
equation (2) by OLS or robust GLS. 
 
Obviously, the assumption that both contracting decisions are uncorrelated may be restrictive. 
For instance, joining WTW budgets with municipalities may decrease the need of contracting 
out to private providers. To test for such substitution (or complementary) effect, we can easily 
exploit coefficient estimates from the equations. In particular, from the coefficient estimates of 
ajoin we can derive estimates for the Mills ratios (or: truncated moments) for yearly municipality 
observations with Cjoin = 0 and Cjoin = 1, respectively. Next, the correlation estimate of the Mills   21 
ratios with the estimated values of ε provides us with an estimate of the correlation between 
both contracting modes.  
Effectiveness of contracting modes: two research strategies 
As to the impact of contracting modes on the effectiveness of WTW-services, the performance 
of municipalities can be measured by multiple performance outcomes. Obviously, as the 
primary goal of WTW-services entails the reintegration of SA clients, we are interested in the 
impact on outflow rates out of the scheme.
7  In addition, if WTW-policies also increase the 
durability of new jobs, this will lead to a reduced inflow in the SA scheme. In our empirical 
analysis we will therefore investigate the effect of contracting modes on (log) percentage of SA 
recipients of the municipality population – essentially representing the combined effect of 
inflow and outflow responses – as well as the outflow and inflow rates. As a benchmark model 
that explains the percentage of SA recipients (SA) we have 
 
(3)  ln ( SAit )      =    bjoin Cjoin, it   + bin WTWin, it    +  bout WTWout, it   +   Xit b   +   ηit 
 
with η as a residual term that is identically and independently distributed with mean zero an 
variance ση
2. Further, bjoin , bin  and   bout describe the effects of contracting with other 
municipalities, the WTW spending that has been provided in-house (WTWin) and the WTW 
spending that has been contracted out to private providers (WTWout). b describes the effects of 
the municipality characteristics X . SA represents the percentage of municipality inhabitants 
between the age of 15 and 65 that receives SA benefits. Similar to the equations (1) and (2), 
note that equation (3) is estimated while allowing for municipality specific clustering effects. 
 
Apparently, both contracting modes in equation (3) may be associated with endogeneity 
problems. For instance, with lump sum budgeting of SA benefits, successful municipalities with 
low SA incidence rates will have a surplus on their budgets for their benefits. This may 
discourage these municipalities to contract out or to join their efforts with other municipalities. 
In both cases the effect of the contracting modes will be underestimated as a result of this. To 
take such endogeneity effects into account, we use two separate research designs for the two 
respective contracting modes. These designs follow from the types of data we have on 
contracting modes, which is discrete for the decision of contracting with other municipalities 
and continuous for the contracting out decision. 
 
First, as the decision to join WTW-efforts is discrete, we estimate equation (3) in a two stage 
treatment selection model, using the Mills ratio estimates resulting from equation (1) of the 
contract joining decision to control for any endogeneity effects. In this setting X provides us 
 
7 This measure also captures outflow out the scheme due to the start of old age pensions or other reasons other than 
reintegration, but we may expect the size of it to be unrelated to WTW-policies.   22 
with two variables that can be used as exclusion restrictions – that is, variables that are assumed 
not to affect the SA percentage of municipalities directly and therefore can be excluded from 
the second estimation stage as explanatory variables. These variables are the WTW 




Our second research design takes advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the data by estimating 
equation (3) with municipality fixed effects. Thus, the assumption would be that unobserved 
municipality characteristics that determine the SA percentage and contracting modes are 
constant over time. For the identification of the coefficient variable of joining contracting such 
an approach is not likely to work, as the number of municipality that have switched from 
contracting by oneself to contracting with other municipalities (or reverse) is very limited. For 
the share of WTW-budgets that has been contracted out, this approach however suits better.  
3.3  Contracting with other municipalities 
Table 3.1 presents the marginal coefficient estimates from Probit (and Logit) regressions on the 
occurrence of municipalities contracting with other municipalities – i.e. equation (1). The 
picture that emerges is roughly similar for both specifications, with most coefficient estimates 
being insignificant. To start with, smaller municipalities are more likely to contract with other 
municipalities. This confirms the asset specificity hypothesis – with municipalities being more 
likely to contract if the gains from specialization are large. Evidence favouring the 
contractibility hypothesis is however weak. When using the expected fraction of SA recipients 
as an overall proxy for the level of difficulty of reintegrating clients, the estimated coefficient 
value has the expected (positive) sign but is borderline significant only. 
 
By contrast, we do find evidence for the public patronage hypothesis in our data. In particular, 
municipalities with tight budgets are more likely to contract with other municipalities. An 
increase of the WTW expenditure per client with 1,000 euros leads to a 5%-point lower 
probability of contracting with other municipalities. Similarly, the isolated effect of budget 
tightness for the (40) municipality observations with deficits on the contracting probability is 
about 7%-point – as compared to the average probability. These findings suggest that WTW 
costs are expected to be lower or less uncertain if WTW services are provided jointly. 
Interestingly, we also find evidence for municipalities with many left wing voters being more 
eager to contract with other municipalities. It may be that these municipalities have more trust 
in joining their efforts with other municipalities than right wing politicians do, rather than 
fearing free rider problems that come with it. 
 
8 Similarly, these variables can in principle be used as instruments in a two stage regression for the contracting out equation 
as well, provided they meet the usual instrument validity requirements. As we will show later on, this is not the case.   23 
 
Table 3.1  Coefficient estimates for probability models of contracting with other municipalities (marginal 
effects; st. errors in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at 10% and 1%, respectively). 
  Probit model (i)      Probit model (ii)           Logit model 
             
Expected fraction of SA recipients       0.396   (0.218)*  0.284   (0.193) 
             
WTW expenditures per client  (x1,000 euro)  ─ 0.054   (0.014)**  ─ 0.051   (0.015)**  ─ 0.041   (0.010)** 
WTW expenditures as fraction of WTW budget  0.095   (0.042)**  0.088   (0.040)**  0.065*   (0.029)* 
             
Characteristics population (fractions)             
Male  0.888   (0.748)  0.578   (0.686)  0.447   (0.556) 
Disabled  0.654   (0.811)  0.204   (0.712)  0.118   (0.571) 
Non-native  ─ 0.392   (0.201)**  ─ 0.361   (0.188)*  ─ 0.261   (0.149)* 
Medium education  ─ 0.654   (0.462)  ─ 0.640   (0.489)  ─ 0.482   (0.353) 
High education  ─ 0.368   (0.281)  ─ 0.286   (0.278)  ─ 0.246   (0.218) 
             
25-34 years of age  0.354   (0.756)  ─ 0.001   (0.727)  0.052   (0.575) 
35-44 years of age  0.161   (0.743)  ─ 0.008   (0.694)  0.023   (0.559) 
45-54 years of age  0.507   (0.707)  0.332   (0.649)  0.236   (0.506 
55-65 years of age  ─ 0.279   (0.874)  ─ 0.147   (0.785)  ─ 0.136   (0.622) 
             
Log population size, corrected 
a  ─ 0.032   (0.018)*  ─ 0.035   (0.018)*  ─ 0.026   (0.015)* 
             
Household characteristics (fractions)             
One person households  0.077   (0.192)  ─ 0.202   (0.234)  ─ 0.117   (0.177) 
Lone parent families  0.311   (1.262)  ─ 1.250   (1.420)  ─ 0.840   (1.159) 
Rental houses  ─ 0.007   (0.206)  ─ 0.029   (0.189)  0.004   (0.147) 
Subsidized rental houses  0.039   (0.176)  0.002   (0.159)  ─ 0.007   (0.116) 
In urban environment  0.013   (0.041)  0.032   (0.040)  0.022   (0.034) 
             
Fraction votes for left wing parties  0.131   (0.068)**  0.121   (0.066)**  0.084   (0.049)* 
             
Year = 2008  ─ 0.013   (0.016)  ─ 0.009   (0.015)  ─ 0.009   (0.012) 
             
Observations  332    332    332   
             
Log likelihood  ─ 81.8    ─ 80.2    ─ 78.6   
              a Note that we include the average population size per municipality group that cooperate, as we model the choice of individual 
municipalities to join their WTW policies. 
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3.4  Contracting out to private providers 
Table 3.2 shows the coefficient estimates for models explaining the share of WTW-services that 
is contracted out to private providers (see equation (2)). In the survey data on contracted shares, 
rounded figures are well overrepresented. Next to the standard (linear) OLS specification (in the 
first column), we therefore have conducted ordered Probit and Logit regressions as well – thus 
taking into account measurement errors.
9 When comparing the three specifications, we find the 
estimation results to be quite similar. Similar to the contracting model with other municipalities, 
the vast majority of coefficient estimates is insignificant. The evidence points at the public 
patronage hypothesis only, with high WTW budgets being associated with a lower share of 
contracting to private providers. Further, the share of contracting is found to increase with 
respect to the fraction of lone parent families. This may be due to asset specificity which is 
particularly high for this group and therefore cannot be provided in-house. Contracting out is 
less likely if the share of older workers in the working population is. A possible explanation for 
this is that older workers are often exempted from WTW programs. 
 
As we find both contracting decisions to be driven by budget considerations, the question arises 
whether the two can be considered as substitute provision modes. In particular, if both forms of 
external provision contribute to cost reductions, this may hold for other (unobserved) cost 
drivers as well. We tested for this along the lines as explained in the previous subsection, 
yielding an estimated correlation coefficient equal to 0.104 (0.226). From this we conclude that 
both contracting decisions are made on different grounds – at least to the extent that these are 
unobserved. Stated differently, the extent of contracting out to private providers is not 




9 In the ordered regressions, we used five categories for the observed fractions, each with equal support size (of 20%-
points).    25 
Table 3.2  Coefficient estimates of model variants explaining the contracted share of WTW services 
(standard errors in parentheses; * and ** denote significance at 10% and 1%, respectively) 
  (i) Linear model 
(benchmark) 
(ii) Ordered Probit  (iii)  Ordered Logit 
             
Expected fraction SA recipients   ─ 0.240   (0.363)  ─ 0.946   (1.505)  ─ 0.746   (2.574) 
             
WTW expenditures per client (x1,000 euro)  ─ 0.019   (0.007)**  ─ 0.000   (0.000)*  ─ 0.000   (0.000)* 
WTW spending as fraction of WTW budget  ─ 0.002   (0.041)  ─ 0.039   (0.181)  ─ 0.067   (0.298) 
             
Characteristics population (fractions)             
Male  1.365   (1.505)  8.140   (6.107)  15.96   (10.54) 
Disabled  0.281   (1.514)  ─ 1.808   (6.679)  ─ 3.151   (11.25) 
Non-native  ─ 0.115   (0.278)  ─ 0.658   (1.306)  ─ 1.134   (2.176) 
Medium education  0.320   (0.777)  0.214   (3.705)  ─ 1.035   (6.165) 
High education  0.037   (0.574)  0.458   (2.562)  0.896   (4.303) 
             
25-34 years of age  ─ 1.871   (1.681)  ─ 8.000   (6.838)  ─ 17.44   (11.74) 
35-44 years of age  ─ 1.461   (1.411)  ─ 5.590   (6.793)  ─ 11.37   (11.34) 
45-54 years of age  ─ 2.548   (1.550)  ─ 8.967   (5.972)  ─ 15.85   (10.30) 
55-65 years of age  ─ 3.616   (1.606)**  ─12.665   (7.609)*  ─ 25.67   (12.68)* 
             
Log population size  ─ 0.021   (0.026)  ─ 0.178   (0.114)  ─ 0.278   (0.194) 
             
Household characteristics (fractions)             
One person households  0.067   (0.400)  ─ 0.437   (1.776)  ─ 1.670   (2.951) 
Lone parent families  4.959   (2.861)*  18.109   (10.62)*  28.56   (18.98) 
Rental houses  0.545   (0.383)  3.349   (1.900)*  5.789   (3.236)* 
Subsidized rental houses  ─ 0.996   (0.362)**  ─ 5.406   (1.817)**  ─ 9.717   (3.136)** 
Inhabitants in urban environment  0.077   (0.073)  0.383   (0.311)  0.757   (0.535) 
             
Fraction votes for left wing parties  ─ 0.035   (0.094)  ─ 0.003   (0.387)  0.128   (0.666) 
             
Year = 2008  ─ 0.007   (0.030)  ─ 0.196   (0.142)  ─ 0.379   (0.245) 
             
Observations  300    300    300   
             
Log Likelihood      ─ 465.0    ─ 463.8   
(pseudo-) R-squared  0.099    0.036    0.038   
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3.5  Effectiveness of contracting modes 
Table 3.3 shows coefficient estimates of equation (3), explaining the log value of SA recipient 
fractions in municipalities. As becomes apparent from the table, both the two stage selection 
model and the model with municipality fixed effects are estimated to take account of potential 
endogeneity problems – e.g. stemming from the fact that municipalities with high SA incidence 
are more likely to contract with other municipalities. The table clearly shows that the most 
important variable in explaining the SA rates is the expected fraction of recipients that follows 
from the budgeting formula. Except for the fixed effects model, the estimated elasticity for this 
variable is close to one, suggesting that it is a good proxy for the actual SA percentage, with 
only little explanatory room left for any other municipality characteristics we observe.
10   
 
When turning to the parameters describing the provision of WTW services, the first thing to 
note is that the effect of contracting with other municipalities is insignificant for all 
specifications. For the fixed effects specification this is not surprising, as we only observe 11 
municipalities that have switched from contracting by oneself to contracting with other 
municipalities, or reverse. For the selection model for the contracting decision with other 
municipalities, where exploit the two variables as exclusion restrictions, the efficiency of our 
estimates seems far more acceptable, but results are still insignificant (i.e. second column of 
table 3.3). Further, we find a negative correlation between contracting decision and SA fraction, 
suggesting that municipalities with better SA performance are more likely to join with other 
municipalities. 
 
As to the contracting decision to private providers, the interesting result emerges that the 
effectiveness of in-house and contracted expenditures are both significant and virtually equal to 
each other.
11 In particular, we find estimated coefficient values to range from ─0.020 to ─0.013, 
meaning that an increase in the WTW-budget per client decreases the number of SA recipients 
with 2.0% to 1.3%, respectively. So benefit savings are small, regardless the provision mode 
that is used.
12 Unfortunately, we do not have any variables in our sample that are important in 
explaining the in-house and external fraction of WTW spending and can be used for IV 
regressions. As has become apparent from Table 3.2, both the indicator for budget tightness and 
the fraction of left wing voters would be too weak to use as valid instruments. Still, the overall 
picture that emerges from the OLS and FE estimates is that the impact is fairly robust. 
 
10 We also estimated model versions were the budgeted SA rate was excluded. This yielded coefficient variables of the other 
variables with higher significance, but lower overall explanatory power. Moreover, we did not obtain results for the 
contracting variable coefficients that were different. 
11 To avoid any endogeneity problems here, we first recalculated the WTW budget per client by dividing through the 
expected (budgeted) number of SA recipients – so not the observed numbers. 
12 As a result, SA benefit savings will amount to 20 tot 35% of the additional WTW spending of an extra euro.     27 
Table 3.3  Estimation coefficients on log value of SA percentage (standard errors in parentheses). 
        OLS  Treatment selection 
model : contracting with 
other municipalities 
    Municipality fixed 
                     effects  
             
Municipality contracting with other 
municipalities 
─ 0.043   (0.041)  0.078   (0.070)  ─ 0.142   (0.108) 
WTW expenditures: public (x1,000 euro)  ─ 0.016   (0.002)**  ─ 0.014   (0.004)*  ─ 0.019   (0.009)* 
WTW expenditures: private (x1,000 euro)  ─ 0.016   (0.005)**  ─ 0.013   (0.005)**  ─ 0.020   (0.008)* 
             
Expected fraction SA recipients, log value   0.944   (0.032)**  0.930   (0.027)**  0.214   (0.145) 
             
Characteristics population (fractions)           
Fraction male  ─ 0.620   (0.565)  ─ 0.742   (0.649)  ─ 1.052   (1.026) 
Fraction disabled  1.065   (0.874)  1.285   (0.759)*  2.904   (1.209) 
Fraction non-native  ─ 0.205   (0.167)  ─ 0.237   (0.142)*  0.312   (1.152) 
Fraction medium educ.  ─ 0.132   (0.413)  ─ 0.173   (0.403)  0.226   (0.959) 
Fraction high education  ─ 0.177   (0.308)  ─ 0.200   (0.276)  1.551   (1.328) 
             
25-34 years of age  ─ 0.418   (0.728)  ─ 0.562   (0.737)  ─ 1.271   (1.426) 
35-44 years of age  ─ 0.547   (0.588)  ─ 0.611   (0.731)  ─ 2.291   (1.470) 
45-54 years of age  ─ 0.680   (0.676)  ─ 1.111   (0.731)*  ─ 1.230   (1.613) 
55-65 years of age  ─ 0.179   (0.676)  ─ 0.419   (0.821)  ─ 3.582   (1.467)* 
             
Log population size  0.001   (0.033)  ─ 0.036   (0.050)  0.593   (0.283)* 
Log population size, corrected  ─ 0.005   (0.034)  0.029   (0.051)  ─ 0.087   (0.081) 
             
Household characteristics (fractions) 
One person households  ─ 0.058   (0.161)  0.001   (0.178)  ─ 2.075  (3.156) 
Lone parent families  ─ 0.939   (1.059)  ─ 0.459   (1.108)  ─ 5.490  (9.389) 
Rental houses  0.600   (0.256)**  0.616   (0.199)**  0.303  (0.495) 
Subsidized rental houses  ─ 0.151   (0.290)  ─ 0.128   (0.193)  1.770  (1.602) 
Inhabitants in urban environment  ─ 0.042   (0.041)  ─ 0.038   (0.034)  ─ 0.232  (0.389) 
             
Year = 2008  0.030   (0.014)*  0.033   (0.016)*  ─ 0.008  (0.043) 
             
Mills ratio      ─ 0.058   (0.026)**     
Observations  321    300    321   
R-squared  0.968        0.690   
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Table 3.4 presents estimated coefficients for the effect of the contracting variables on the log 
values of the fraction of SA recipients, the inflow rate and the outflow rate as variables that are 
to be explained. Again we find municipality groups that contract with each other perform 
similarly as those who do not. As to the amounts of WTW spending that are in-house and 
externally, the estimated effectiveness is (statistically) equal in all specifications. The evidence 
is strongest that the WTW-spending increases outflow rates out of SA. Here, the obtained 
coefficients are quite similar to studies on job training effectiveness. In particular, recent work 
of Groot et al. (2008) finds the impact of job training programs for SA recipients in the 
Netherlands to amount to 2.5 %-point – compared to an average outflow rate of 17.3%. When 
taking the same average outflow rate as a point of reference, our estimates would imply an 
increase of the outflow rate between 0.6 to 0.9% point – which is roughly three times smaller in 
size – but this difference can be well explained by the fact that the costs per program were 
around 3,000 euro in the other study.  
 
Table 3.4  Coefficient estimates of the effect of contracting on incidence, inflow and outflow out of SA  
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4  Discussion 
Similar to earlier research and for different public services, our estimation results lend credence 
to public patronage. Municipalities respond to budget constraints, particularly when these are 
tighter. This applies to the decision to contract with other municipalities and, to a lesser extent, 
to that of contracting out to private providers. As most municipalities had quite large budgets in 
the time period under investigation, one may suspect that too much of their budgets were spent 
on in-house provision. But when considering our estimation results on the performance of 
municipalities, we do not find any evidence for private provision to be more effective. Instead, 
it seems the effectiveness of internal and external WTW spending is remarkably similar. The 
most optimistic view on these results would be that municipalities optimize their contracting 
decisions, with effectiveness being equal at the margin. At the same time, however, there are 
three other interpretations that tend to be more pessimistic. 
 
The first interpretation is that our contract measures are simply too global and our data size too 
small to obtain significant estimates. Compared to the estimate that is obtained from the 
budgeting formula, the impact of WTW-spending on the percentage of SA-recipients is only 
small (but significant). So when supposing that changing provision modes can only change 
effectiveness to some extent, the coefficient estimates will be even smaller. With more precise 
data that are measured at the level of individual clients within municipalities and with different 
providers, obtaining significant estimates is more likely.  
 
Second, one should also take in mind the institutional context of the Dutch municipalities prior 
to 2007. From 2002 to 2006, private provision of WTW-services by municipalities was 
compulsory. As of 2006, the share of in-house provision has increased gradually but still is at a 
relatively low level. One may not expect that municipalities have reached the extent of in-house 
provision they prefer, thus curbing inefficiencies that may result from public patronage.  
 
Third, it should be noted that public and private WTW providers are perhaps not that different 
after all. The majority of private providers in the WTW sector – at least those contracted by 
municipalities – consist of non-profit organizations with strong ties to the social assistance 
desks. These organizations have long term contracts and are often formed a department of the 
municipality services for a long time. This may explain why differences are hard to detect. 
 
All in all, our results suggest that differences in WTW provision modes are not very important – 
at least when measured in effectiveness. This conclusion would however ignore the cost 
efficiency of the programs. If the public patronage hypothesis holds, costs per client are likely 
to be (or will be) unnecessarily high. Evidence from the Australian Job Network shows that 
privatization has led to substantial cost reductions, while maintaining the same level of   30 
effectiveness (Finn 2008). This calls for further research on the costs attached to the provision 
of WTW programs. 
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